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Decisions made by operational commanders at emergency incidents have been characterized as involving
a period of information gathering followed by courses of action that are often generated without explicit
plan formulation. We examined the efficacy of goal-oriented training in engendering explicit planning
that would enable better communication at emergency incidents. While standard training mirrored current
operational guidance, goal-oriented training incorporated “decision controls” that highlighted the impor-
tance of evaluating goals, anticipated consequences, and risk/benefit analyses once a potential course of
action has been identified. In Experiment 1, 3 scenarios (a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire)
were presented in a virtual environment, and in Experiment 2 they were recreated on the fireground. In
Experiment 3, the house fire was recreated as a “live burn,” and incident commanders and their crews
responded to this scenario as an emergency incident. In all experiments, groups given standard training
showed the reported tendency to move directly from information gathering to action, whereas those given
goal-oriented training were more likely to develop explicit plans and show anticipatory situational
awareness. These results indicate that training can be readily modified to promote explicit plan
formulation that could facilitate plan sharing between incident commanders and their teams.
Keywords: decision making, situational assessment, plan formulation, decision controls
Understanding decision making in frontline personnel attending
emergency incidents is central to the development of operational
guidance and increasing safety. Operational models in the United
Kingdom emergency services (e.g., Chief Fire and Rescue Advi-
sor, 2008) follow normative analyses of decision making where
information gathering precedes the consideration of alternative
courses of action and the formulation and execution of a plan (e.g.,
Dewey, 1933; see also, Lipshitz & Bar-Ilan, 1996; van den Heuvel,
Alison, & Power, 2014). However, detailed investigation of deci-
sion making by operational commanders at emergency incidents
indicates that periods of information gathering (i.e., situation as-
sessment) are often followed by the adoption of courses of action
(i.e., plan execution) without any apparent mediation by a stage of
evaluation or plan formulation. This surprising observation was
first highlighted through an analysis of the retrospective reports of
incident commanders in North America (Klein, Calderwood, &
MacGregor, 1989; see also, Klein, 1998), but it is also evident in
their professional counterparts in the United Kingdom, whose
behavior was recently investigated in situ at emergency incidents
(Cohen-Hatton, Butler, & Honey, 2015; see also, Rake & Njå,
2009).
Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015) examined first-person audio-visual
recordings from helmet-mounted cameras (cf. McLennan, Omo-
dei, Rich, & Wearing, 1997) worn by incident commanders in the
United Kingdom Fire and Rescue Service who were attending a
sample of 33 incidents, ranging from those involving little threat to
human life to major road traffic accidents. The audio-visual record
was independently coded as a continuous stream of the relevant
categories, namely situation assessment (SA), plan formulation
(PF), and plan execution (PE), and the transitions between these
categories were then analyzed. Of most interest were the transi-
tions from SA, which were significantly more likely to be to PE
than PF (cf. Klein et al., 1989). Moreover, this pattern was evident
from the outset of the incidents, when planning might be expected
to be most evident. One interpretation of this pattern of results is
that decision making in operational contexts often occurs without
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reflective processes of plan formulation, and instead relies on more
reflexive processes like recognition-primed decision making
(Klein, 1993; see also, Gore, Flin, Stanton, & Wong, 2015), or
associative priming more generally (e.g., Doya, 2008; Honey,
2000), with the situation coming to evoke courses of action
through the effects of instruction or direct experience. An alterna-
tive interpretation is that plans are reliably formulated and evalu-
ated through reflective processes, but are simply not evident in
behavior (Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015) or not recalled (Klein et al.,
1989). According to this interpretation, the patterns of transition
described by Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015; see also, Klein et al.,
1989) were a product of reflective processes that were routinely
applied but only inconsistently made explicit.
Whichever interpretation is accurate, it remains the case that
information concerning planning can only be communicated ef-
fectively with other members of the emergency response teams
when it is explicit. In several operational contexts, it has been
argued that the development of explicit plans enables shared
situational awareness and goals that support a common operating
picture (e.g., Endsley, 1995; Schmitt & Klein, 1999) and interop-
erability (House, Power, & Alison, 2014; Stanton, Salmon, &
Walker, 2015). For example, Alison, Power, van den Heuvel,
Humann, Palasinski, and Crego (2015) suggest that communica-
tion between different agencies (including police, fire, ambulance,
and military) attending a simulated disaster is decreased when
superordinate goals are lacking. Moreover, at an individual level,
a planned course of action that has been assessed with respect to
goals, anticipated consequences and an assessment of risk, might
provide an incident commander with more confidence to imple-
ment that plan, and reduce decision inertia resulting from uncer-
tainty (van de Heuvel, Alison, & Crego, 2012; see also, Klein,
Snowden, & Pin, 2010).
There are, no doubt, circumstances where reflexive decisions
are useful for commanders, particularly in highly dynamic situa-
tions where action is required immediately. For example, consider
the case of the first responding incident commander at a house fire.
The immediate recognition of cues (e.g., indicators that people are
in need of rescue; the color and pattern of the smoke) can trigger
certain actions that need to be initiated immediately. There are
situations, however, when the action triggered by a cue might not
be appropriate for the whole incident. To return to the example
considered immediately above: The indication that there are peo-
ple trapped in a building might trigger the commander to commit
crews into the building to rescue them immediately, but if consid-
ered in conjunction with smoke patterns that suggest a backdraft is
imminent, then alternative actions might be needed first, and
planning is necessary. A critical issue, therefore, is how best to
encourage explicit planning.
The primary aim of our three experiments was assessing
whether or not a brief period of goal-oriented training affects the
development of explicit plans in experienced incident command-
ers. To do so, we examined the efficacy of supplementing standard
operational training with the use of “decision controls”: rapid
mental checks concerning goals, anticipated consequences, and an
evaluation of risks versus benefits. The goal-oriented training
emphasized using these controls when a course of action had been
selected, and was intended to ensure that courses of action are
routinely evaluated irrespective of whether they have been gener-
ated by reflective (see Ajzen, 1991; Dewey, 1933) or reflexive
processes (e.g., Doya, 2008; Klein, 1993).
The influence of goal-oriented training was assessed in a variety
of scenarios and simulated environments. The three scenarios (a
house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire) were first presented
within a fully immersive virtual reality (VR) environment (Exper-
iment 1). Once the effectiveness of goal-oriented training had been
established in a VR environment, it was then assessed when the
same scenarios were recreated as fire-ground simulations (Exper-
iment 2). Finally, the house fire scenario was recreated as a “live
burn” to which the fire crews and incident commanders responded
as an emergency incident (Experiment 3). In other respects, the
methodology matched that adopted by Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015;
see also, McLennan et al., 1997). Thus, the behavior of incident
commanders was either video-recorded using a fixed camera in the
VR suite (Experiment 1) or recorded from helmet-mounted cam-
eras (Experiments 2 and 3), and the footage was then coded as
reflecting SA, PF, and PE. The transitions between these catego-
ries were used to assess whether or not the process of decision
making was affected by the nature of training.
Of specific interest in each of the experiments were the transi-
tions between SA and successive categories (i.e., PF and PE), and
between PF and either SA or PE, because it was at these transitions
where goal-oriented training should have an effect. In particular,
we predicted that this training would have a marked influence on
the transition from SA to PE, which we assumed was based
ordinarily on reflexive processes or a failure to make reflective
process explicit; but it would have less of an impact on that from
PF to either PE or SA, which we assumed was already controlled
by reflective processes. Like Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015), we also
assessed situational awareness at the transitions from situational
assessment to plan formulation and plan execution. Endsley (1995,
2015) separated situation awareness into three levels: Level 1,
involving the perception of elements of the situation; Level 2,
relating to the understanding of the situation; and, most relevant to
our concerns, Level 3, which involves anticipation of the likely
development of the situation. For an operational commander,
anticipation of the likely development of the situation can have a
critical bearing on safety as it allows the identification of actions
necessary for preventing the escalation of the incident, and ensures
that any actions taken are considered in the context of the incident.
For example, a commander showing Level 2 situation awareness
may be focusing on the immediate application of water to a severe
fire, and responds directly to the current situation. A commander
showing Level 3 situation awareness may consider the likely
spread of the fire, predict that the application of water will not be
sufficient to restrict the spread, and then create a fire break to
prevent the anticipated spread. In Experiments 1–3, assessing
anticipation of the likely development of the situation (Level 3
situational awareness) allowed a further index of the efficacy of
goal-oriented training.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigated whether a brief period of goal-
oriented training affected decision making processes in experi-
enced (Level 1 and Level 2) incident commanders at three simu-
lated incidents: a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire.
These incidents were presented in an immersive VR environment
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396 COHEN-HATTON AND HONEY
at the Fire Service College (Moreton-in-Marsh, United Kingdom).
There were two principal groups: Standard and Decision. Both
groups included Level 1 and Level 2 commanders and both re-
ceived a set of slides accompanied by a test exercise that was
designed to reinforce key aspects of the presentations. For Group
Standard, the training slides mirrored conventional guidance and
during the exercise participants were shown footage of a water
rescue incident and at key decision points the footage was paused
and participants were asked what action they would take next and
why. For Group Decision, slides were included that highlighted the
use decision controls, which involved using a rapid mental check
list of questions at key decision points: Why am I doing this (i.e.,
what are my goals)? What do I expect to happen (i.e., what are the
anticipated consequences)? and Are the benefits worth the risks?
When participants given goal-oriented training watched the foot-
age, and were asked what actions they would take next, they were
directed to answer with reference to the decision controls. The two
types of training lasted, approximately, 1 hr.
Within an hour of the completion of training, all participants
received the three fully immersive VR scenarios. Each scenario
was displayed on a screen, and both the screen and participants’
behavior were recorded by a video camera as the participants
engaged in their role as incident commander. This role involved
the participants interacting with and directing avatars. Trained
assistants in an adjacent room controlled the behavior of the
avatars. At predetermined points within the scenarios, participants
received standardized “injects” to which they had to respond.
Some of these injects involved the avatars (e.g., a distraught parent
indicating that their child was trapped in the fire) and others
involved events (e.g., the initial deployment of resources at the
incident). Eight of these injects were typical of those that might be
experienced at that type of incident (e.g., a person being trapped
inside the house fire), while the remaining two were less so. For
example, one inject involved a rapid rise in temperature, indicating
abnormal fire behavior (a flashover) and impending danger to
firefighters, at a point where a person remained in need of rescue.
This inject results in conflicting goals of firefighter safety and
saving life. The latency to respond to these unexpected injects
(e.g., by issuing a directive) provided one assessment of whether
the differences in training had any general influence on the speed
with which incident commanders reacted to incoming information.
However, our principal interest was the footage of each scenario,
which was independently scored in the way summarized above
(e.g., as SA, PF, and PE) and described in detail below.1
Method
Participants. Forty-eight male incident commanders volun-
teered for this study and provided informed consent for their
participation in accordance with local ethical approval through the
School of Psychology, Cardiff University. They were drawn from
11 United Kingdom Fire and Rescue Services: Avon Fire and
Rescue Service, Buckinghamshire Fire and Rescue Service,
Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, Hampshire Fire and
Rescue Service, Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service, Northamp-
tonshire Fire and Rescue Service, South Wales Fire and Rescue
Service, Tyne and Wear Fire and Rescue Service, West Midlands
Fire Service, West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service, and Wilt-
shire Fire and Rescue Service. The sample included Level 1
incident commanders (N  24), usually the first Fire and Rescue
staff on scene at an incident, and Level 2 commanders (N  24),
who provide command at a higher risk or more complex incidents.
The participants were placed in the four groups on the basis of
whether they were to receive standard or decision training and
were Level 1 or Level 2 commanders. The participants were not
informed that there were two types of training. The number of
Level 1 and Level 2 commanders in each group was equated, and
participants from the same Fire and Rescue Service were evenly
distributed across the four groups: Standard/Level 1, Decision/
Level 1, Standard/Level 2, and Decision/Level 2. Previous oper-
ational exposure was assessed in a questionnaire that identified
how long each participant had spent in operational command
positions. The mean overall command experience was 11.97 years
(SEM  0.99; range: 0.70–26.50 years; 7 officers 5 years, 13
with 5–10 years inclusive, 15 with 11–15 years inclusive, 5 with
16–20 inclusive, 6 with 20 years). The mean command experi-
ence in the current position was 18.00 years (SEM  .75; range:
0.50–18.5 years; 22 officers 5 years, 12 with 5–10 years inclu-
sive, 10 with 11–15 years inclusive, 2 with 16–20 inclusive, 0
officers 20 years).
Equipment. The participants wore standard issue fire service
uniforms. The training presentations were displayed using Prezi on
a laptop computer with a 15.2” screen (HP Pavilion, Hewlett
Packard). The three scenarios were delivered using incident com-
mand simulation software (BlueHawk, The Fire Service College).
A high-definition video camera (Handycam HD, Sony) placed on
a tripod in the rear right corner of the experimental room (5  5
M) simultaneously captured commands from the participants and
video footage from a screen (168 cm 97 cm) displaying the view
of the incident that was being displayed to the participant using the
VR goggles (Oculus Rift Development 1, Oculus). Footage was
replayed to the participants using a laptop computer (HP Pavilion,
Hewlett Packard) on a 15.2” screen, during a cued-recall debrief
interview. Each participant’s responses during the cued recall
interview were recorded using webcams (c270, Logitech). Qual-
trics Survey Software was used as a platform to host the incident
experience questionnaire, which was delivered on a laptop com-
puter (Alienware 18, Alienware Computers).
Nature of the scenarios. Each participant experienced three
scenarios that were representative of fire and rescue service oper-
ational activity. Role players were used for each avatar that inter-
acted with the incident commander. All scenarios were scripted,
with 10 injects per scenario. Each role player had a script contain-
ing the information that their character had at their disposal. Any
other information that participants requested that was not included
in the script was to be answered with “I don’t know.” The three
scenarios are summarized below.
1. House fire. Participants were confronted with fire in a
domestic property and a distraught parent indicating their child
was trapped inside the burning house. This is a typical incident that
Level 1 or Level 2 commanders could expect to command, and
represents a dynamic situation where action is urgently required,
1 This footage was also replayed to the participants, which enabled the
resulting transcripts of their commentary to provide converging evidence
on the few occasions when independent coding had revealed an ambiguity
in the categorization of the activity.
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397GOAL-ORIENTED TRAINING
and there is a high risk to both firefighters and to the missing child.
An example of a standard inject was the arrival of a second fire
crew, and of an unexpected event was the receipt of information to
suggest that the child was in a location other than the one last
reported. The interval between the 10 injects was, on average, 1–2
min, and there were five main avatars that interacted.
2. Road traffic collision. A car had been involved in a road
traffic collision with another vehicle. One person was trapped
because of the nature of their injuries, suffering from neck and
back pain as a result of the collision. The car later transpired to be
an undercover police car, with covert video cameras making stan-
dard extrication techniques difficult. This incident has a high risk
to life, as there is a trapped casualty, but time pressure is low,
allowing the commander time to consider their course of action.
An example of a standard inject was the arrival of a second fire
crew, and of an unexpected event was the failure of a critical piece
of equipment. The interval between the 10 injects was, on average,
2 min, and there were five main avatars that interacted with the
participant.
3. Skip fire spreading to adjoining shop. Participants were
initially alerted to a shop fire, although on arrival it transpired that
there was a fire in a skip in the yard behind the shop, which later
spreads to the shop. There are a number of considerations: the
difficulty in gaining access to the site, the fire not extinguishing in
the way expected given the information provided on the contents
of the skip, and a number of residential flats in the adjoining
properties that might be affected. An example of a standard inject
was the arrival of a second fire crew, and an unexpected inject was
the failure of the water supply. The interval between the 10 injects
was, on average, 1–2 min, and there were four main avatars that
interacted with the participant.
Procedure. Each participant was briefed on the procedure and
gave informed consent for their participation. Participants were
randomly assigned to either Group Standard or Group Decision,
with an equal allocation of Level 1 and Level 2 commanders to
each group. Two participants suffered motion sickness during the
VR scenarios, and the final number of participants was 46. Par-
ticipants either received the Standard or Decision training presen-
tations displayed using Prezi, and their responses to an exercise
embedded within it were recorded using a webcam. The two types
of training were presented in standardized format, and the practical
exercise used to reinforce the training was based upon video
footage of an incident that required the fire and rescue service to
perform a water rescue, where a car was trapped in swollen
floodwater. The video was presented as a series of 11 clips
(approximate durations  1 min.). After each clip, the participants
were invited to describe what their actions would be as the incident
commander of this incident. Those given Standard training were
asked to command as they would presently, using current accepted
practices and were asked to verbalize what they would do next and
why. In contrast, Decision training involved the participants pro-
viding a brief explanation of the questions that should be asked
before a course of action was executed. In particular, three ques-
tions were emphasized: Why am I doing this (i.e., what are my
goals)? What do I expect to happen (i.e., what are the anticipated
consequences)? Are the benefits worth the risks? After each clip,
participants were also asked to verbalize what they would do next,
with reference to these three questions. In neither group were the
participants given feedback regarding their responses. The two
forms of training took, approximately, 60 min.
Once training was complete, the participants were taken to the VR
suite where they took part in each of the three scenarios. The scenarios
were presented in a counterbalanced order within each group. Imme-
diately after each scenario, participants were given a cued recall
debrief. This involved them reviewing the video footage taken from
the video cameras. They were asked to recall their thoughts and
rationale for various decisions at the time the footage was taken. All
footage was stored securely on a drive encrypted with TrueCrypt
software (TrueCrypt version 5.1, TrueCrypt Foundation).
Results
Coding of activity. Table 1 defines the three primary catego-
ries (SA, PF, and PE) alongside specific examples of each category
taken from Experiment 1. These independently coded categories of
activity represent the primary data, and interrater reliability checks
Table 1
Coding Dictionary
Decision phase Incident command model definition Description Example
Situation assessment (SA) Gathering incident, resource, or hazard
information.
Acknowledgement of information
relating to the environment,
surveying scene.
“There’s smoke issuing.”
Plan formulation (PF) Identification and prioritizing objectives,
developing tactical plan.
Problem identification, ordering
of tasks, planning activities,
consideration of rationale.
“We need to stop fire spread . . .
[you] put water in there . . .
[team 2]monitor downstairs to
check for fire spread . . .”
Plan execution (PE) Communicating actions and controlling
activity.
Communication of tasks,
controlling progress of tasks,
setting tempo, changing
activities.
“I want you to search the first
floor, taking a hose reel . . .”
Level 3 situation awareness Anticipation. Evidence of predicting the likely
outcomes of actions, or the
likely development of the
situation.
“I’m thinking of going Tactical
Vent level 3, if I don’t have an
exit port it will get worse . . . ”
“I think that fire is going to
spread next door . . .”
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398 COHEN-HATTON AND HONEY
revealed that the sequences of state transitions were highly reliable
across the two coders (SC-H and RCH). Thus, randomly chosen
excerpts of video footage (one from each of the three scenarios;
see below) were scored by both coders and there was 95%
agreement between the sequences of state transitions that were
generated. Very occasionally the transcripts from the cued-recall
interview were used to clarify interpretation of a transition. Evi-
dence of Level 3 situational awareness (anticipation of how the
situation might unfold) was coded at the transitions from SA
(Endsley, 1995; cf. Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015). Again, the agree-
ment between coders was high 90%.
Occasions when decision controls were explicitly used were
coded in terms of evidence of the explicit consideration of (a)
goals or rationale, (b) identifying expectations, and (c) consider-
ation of the benefits versus the risks of a potential course of action.
Finally, the latency to respond to the unexpected injects (e.g., by
issuing a directive) was measured to provide an index of whether
or not the different forms of training resulted in changes in the
speed with which participants responded to components of the
incident.
Data analysis. A lag sequential analysis characterized how
the categories of activity changed over the course of the three
scenarios. This analysis produces a sequence of transitions from
which the conditional probabilities that SA would be followed by
PF (or PE), and PF by PE (or SA) were derived (Sackett, 1979; see
also, O’Connor, 1999). The analysis starts with the definition of a
criterion position for each participant, which in this case was the
first inject, and thereafter activity coded as SA, PF, and PE was
used to generate a lag sequence of the transitions between the
different categories. The lag sequence removes immediate repeti-
tion of the same category to provide a trace of the category
transitions; for example, the raw sequence SA, SA, SA, PE, PE,
PF, PF, PF SA, PE becomes SA, PE, PF, SA, PE. The analysis
terminates with the end of the scenario. From the resulting traces,
the mean overall conditional probability that one category would
be followed by another was calculated (i.e., SA to PE or PF; PF to
PE or SA; PE to SA or PF). A mean conditional probability of 0.50
for transitions from SA (to PF) indicates that transitions from SA
were equally likely to be to PF as to PE. The statistical analysis
focused on the conditional probabilities of the transitions from SA
to PE, PF to PE, and PE to SA (that can each take a value between
0 and 1); with the transitions from SA to PF, PF to SA, and PE to
PF simply reflecting the reciprocal values.
Lag sequential analysis. Figure 1 depicts the mean condi-
tional probabilities for the transitions from SA to either PF or PE
(upper panels), from PF to either PE or SA (middle panels), and
from PE to either SA or PF (lower panels). The results were pooled
across whether the participants were Level 1 or Level 2 incident
commanders and the three scenarios, because statistical analyses
revealed that these factors had no independent effect and did not
interact with other factors (all Fs 1). The pattern of transitions
from SA for Group Standard was similar to that observed by
Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015) for real incidents attended by the fire
and rescue service: SA was more likely to be followed by PE than
PF. In contrast, for participants in Group Decision, SA was more
likely to be followed by PF than PE. An independent-samples t test
conducted on the probabilities of transition from SA to PE con-
firmed that the groups differed, t(44)  5.36, p  .001, d  1.62;
and one-sample t tests showed that the SA-PE transition was more
likely than would be expected on the basis of chance (0.50) in
Group Standard, t(21)  4.51, p  .001, d  0.96, whereas the
SA-PF transition was more likely than would be expected on the
basis of chance (.50) in Group Decision, t(23)  2.91, p  .01,
d  0.59. Moving on to the transitions from PF, inspection of the
center panels indicates that the PF-PE transition was more likely
than the PF-SA transition in both groups. An independent-samples
t test confirmed that the groups did not differ, t(44)  1.56, p 
.12, d  0.47; and one-sample t tests showed that the PF-PE
transition was more likely than would be expected on the basis of
chance (0.50) in both Group Standard, t(21) 6.34, p .001, d
1.35, and Group Decision, t(23)  12.75, p  .001, d  2.60. For
this transition, Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015) observed that the PF-PE
and PF-SA transitions were equiprobable. Finally, the lower panel
illustrates the probabilities of transition from PE to SA and PF.
Inspection of this panel reveals that PE was more likely to be
followed by SA than PF in both groups. An independent-samples
t test confirmed that there was no significant difference between
the groups, t(44)  0.31, p  0.75, d  0.09; and one-sample t
tests confirmed that the PE-SA transition was more likely than
would be expected on the basis chance (0.50) in Group Standard,
t(21)  22.46, p  .001, d  4.79, and Group Decision, t(23) 
23.06, p  .001, d  4.71 (matching the results reported by
Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015).
Situation awareness. Over the course of the incidents, there
was more Level 3 SA (anticipation) at the SA transitions in Group
Decision (M  11.79, SEM  1.36) than in Group Standard (M 
4.95, SEM  0.97), t(44)  4.01, p  .001, d  1.21. The overall
frequency of transitions from SA (to PF or PE) did not differ
between Groups Standard (M 40.32, SEM 0.75) and Decision
(M  41.46, SEM  0.77), t(44)  1.06, p  .29, d  0.32.
Manipulation checks. The frequency with which participants
mentioned decision controls was greater in Group Decision than in
Group Standard. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) with group and
decision control (goals, expectations, and benefits/risks) as factors,
revealed a main effect group, F(1, 44)  27.47, p  .001, p2 
0.38, decision control, F(2, 88)  67.45, p  .001, p2  0.60, and
an interaction between these two factors F(2, 84) 9.02, p .001,
p2  0.17. Independent-samples t tests showed that Group Deci-
sion was more likely than Group Standard to mention goals (De-
cision: M  16.29, SEM  1.17; Standard: M  7.73, SEM 
0.81), t(44)  5.91, p  .001, d  1.78, and expected outcomes
(Decision: M  8.88, SEM  1.62; Standard: M  3.27, SEM 
0.81), t(44)  2.99, p  .005, d  0.90. Although the frequency
with which benefits/risks were mentioned was numerically higher
in Group Decision (M  2.42, SEM  0.44) than in Group
Standard (M  1.27, SEM  0.39), this difference failed to reach
conventional levels of statistical significance, t(44)  1.95, p 
.058, d  0.59. Finally, the latency to respond to the unexpected
injects did not differ between the groups (Standard: M  5.73 s,
SEM  1.37; Decision: M  4.45s, SEM  .67, t(44)  0.86. p 
.39, d  0.26).
Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated whether the decision making activity
of experienced incident commanders in the fire and rescue service
could be modified by the nature of the training that they had
received before commanding incidents within three VR scenarios.
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399GOAL-ORIENTED TRAINING
Training either followed the standard model of operation guidance
that incident commanders would routinely experience (Group
Standard) or it was goal-oriented, emphasizing goal evaluation,
anticipated outcomes, and risk/benefit analyses before the execu-
tion of a potential course of action (Group Decision). The activity
of incident commanders was coded as SA, PF, and PE, and the
pattern of transitions between these categories was examined. In
Group Standard, the pattern of transitions was similar to those
observed at emergency incidents (Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015), and
echoed qualitative observations (Rake & Njå, 2009) and retrospec-
tive reports (Klein et al., 1989; see also, Klein, 1998). Critically,
SA was more likely to be followed by PE than PF. However, this
failure to exhibit planful behavior was much less apparent in
Group Decision, where SA was more likely to be followed by PF
than PE. This difference in transitions was accompanied by dif-
ferences in the frequency with which decision controls were men-
tioned throughout the incidents. The marked difference in the
pattern of transitions from SA was not accompanied by differences
in the transitions from PF, which were more likely to be to PE in
both groups, or PE, which was more likely to be to SA in both
groups. Moreover, the difference in training had no significant
impact on the latency to respond to a sample of injects (i.e., those
involving unexpected events).
The fact that the pattern of transitions for participants in Group
Standard were similar to those observed at real incidents by
Cohen-Hatton et al. (2015) provides direct support for the sugges-
tion that the scenarios and VR environment engender incident
commander activity that mirrors that seen at real incidents. This
observation suggests that the changes in decision-making pro-
cesses following goal-oriented training would also be seen if
incident commanders were faced with real operational incidents.
However, unlike during real incidents, participants in the VR
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Immersive VR incidents (a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip fire). Mean
(SEM) conditional probabilities of transition from situation assessment (to PF or PE; upper panel); from plan
formulation (to PE or SA; center panel); and from plan execution (to SA or PF; lower panel). The scores for
Groups Standard and Decision are pooled across the three types of incident and the level of the incident
commander (Level 1 or 2). VR  virtual reality; SA  situation assessment; PE  plan execution; PF  plan
formation.
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400 COHEN-HATTON AND HONEY
scenarios were more likely to execute decisions having formulated
a plan as opposed to reassessing the situation. This difference
suggests that one should be cautious before generalizing the results
of Experiment 1 to real operational incidents. In particular, the
influence of goal-oriented training on the likelihood that incident
commanders formulate plans once they have assessed the situation,
needs to be investigated when our scenarios are embedded in more
realistic environments. This was the principal aim of Experiments
2 and 3.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 investigated the impact of goal-oriented training
on incident commanders who were engaged in the same set of
scenarios as Experiment 1, but that were now recreated on the fire
ground at the Fire Service College (Moreton-in-Marsh, United
Kingdom). These simulations, including the injects, closely
matched the three scenarios from Experiment 1. In Experiment 2,
however, standard fire service equipment (e.g., a fire engine) and
resources were used, and fire crews were present. The crews were
blind to the nature of training that the incident commanders had
received. Helmet-mounted cameras were used to record first-
person footage of the activity of incident commanders (cf. Cohen-
Hatton et al., 2015; see also, Roberts, Flin, & Cleland, 2015).
Method
Participants. Ten male Level 1 incident commanders volun-
teered for this study. The smaller number of participants in this
experiment, relative to Experiment 1, reflects the facts that (a) each
incident represents a considerable investment of resources, and (b)
the training had marked effects in Experiment 1. The participants
provided informed consent for their participation in accordance
with local ethical approval through the School of Psychology,
Cardiff University. They were drawn from 6 United Kingdom Fire
and Rescue Services: Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service, South
Wales Fire and Rescue Service, Tyne and Wear Fire and Rescue
Service, Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service, West
Midlands Fire Service, and West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Ser-
vice. The participants were randomly assigned to the two groups,
Standard and Decision. A questionnaire was used to identify how
long each participant had spent in operational command positions.
The mean overall command experience of the Level 1 command-
ers was 10.2 years (SEM  2.12; range: 0.40–22.00 years; 2
officers with 5 years, 4 with 5–10 years inclusive, 1 with 11–15
years inclusive, 2 with 16–20 inclusive, 1 with 20 years).
Equipment. Participants arrived at the incidents in a standard
fire engine, which carried equipment including a 13.5 m ladder, a
pump, 1,800 liters of water, breathing apparatus, and road traffic
collision rescue equipment. The fire engine was crewed by five
firefighters who were not informed about the training that the
incident commanders had been given. The participants wore stan-
dard issue fire service uniforms supplemented by helmet-mounted
1,080 p high-definition video cameras, measuring 42  60  30
mm (GoPro Hero 3, Half Moon Bay). The footage was replayed to
participants on a laptop computer (HP Pavilion, Hewlett Packard),
on a 15.2” screen during a cued-recall debrief interview.
Procedure. The three scenarios matched those used in Exper-
iment 1. The same characters, injects, and timings were used. The
main differences were that the characters were real as opposed to
avatars and the commanders could interact directly and more
naturally with crews. As in Experiment 1, each participant was
briefed on the procedure, gave informed consent for their partici-
pation, and were randomly assigned to either Group Standard or
Group Decision. Initially, 12 commanders were because of partic-
ipate. However, 2 commanders were unable to complete all sce-
narios so their data sets were excluded and the final number of
participants was 10. Participants either experienced the Standard or
Decision training in accordance with the procedure adopted in
Experiment 1. They were then taken to the Fire Service College
training ground where they took part in each scenario. The order in
which the participants received the scenarios was counterbalanced
in the same way for both groups. Commanders were mobilized
from a fire engine, receiving instructions on the nature and location
of the call, which mirrored normal practice. Immediately after each
scenario, participants received a cued recall debrief in the same
way as in Experiment 1. Other details of the procedure that have
not been mentioned were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Lag sequential analysis. Figure 2 shows the mean condi-
tional probabilities for the three types of transition: from SA to
either PF or PE (upper panels), from PF to either PE or SA (middle
panels), and from PE to either SA or PF (lower panels). As in
Experiment 1, these probabilities were pooled across the three
different scenarios. Inspection of the upper panel of this figure
shows that participants in Group Standard behaved in a similar
way to those in the equivalent group in Experiment 1, and to
incident commanders attending real incidents (Cohen-Hatton et al.,
2015): SA was more likely to be followed by PE than PF. How-
ever, and as in Experiment 1, this bias was markedly reduced, if
not reversed on this occasion, in Group Decision. An independent
samples t test conducted on the conditional probabilities for the
SA-PE transition confirmed that the groups differed, t(8)  3.99,
p  .005, d  2.82; and one-sample t tests showed that the SA-PE
transition was more likely than would be expected on the basis of
chance (0.50) in Group Standard, t(4)  5.19, p  .01, d  2.32,
but this was not the case in Group Decision, t(4)  0.13, p  .90,
d  0.06. The transitions from PF were more likely to be to PE
than SA in both groups. An independent-samples t test confirmed
that there was no significant effect of group, t(8)  0.31, p  .76,
d  0.22; and one-sample t tests showed that the PF-PE transition
was more likely than would be expected on the basis of chance
(0.50) in both Groups Standard, t(4)  9.63, p  .005, d  4.30,
and Decision, t(4) 6.74, p .005, d 3.01. There was no group
difference in the PE-SA conditional probabilities, t(8) 0.26, p
.79, d  0.18; and one-sample t tests showed that the PE-SA
transition was more likely than would be expected on the basis of
chance (0.50) in both Groups Standard, t(4)  107.90, p  .001,
d  48.25, and Decision, t(4)  70.17, p  .001, d  31.38.
Situation awareness. Over the course of the incidents, al-
though numerically there was more Level 3 SA (anticipation) at
the SA transitions in Group Decision (M  4.80, SEM  1.65)
than in Group Standard (M  3.20, SEM  0. 37), this difference
was not statistically significant, t(8)  0.94, p  .37, d  0.66.
This difference might either reflect the nature of the simulations or
the fact that there was a smaller number of participants in Exper-
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401GOAL-ORIENTED TRAINING
iment 2 than in Experiment 1. The overall frequency of transitions
from SA did not differ significantly between Groups Standard
(M  55.80, SEM  3.61) and Decision (M  45.00, SEM 
3.18), t(8)  2.24, p  .05, d  1.58.
Manipulation checks. The frequency with which participants
mentioned decision controls (specifically goals and expected out-
comes) was greater in Group Decision than in Group Standard.
ANOVA revealed an effect of group, F(1, 8)  22.70, p  .001,
p2  0.74, decision control (i.e., goals, expectations, and benefits/
risks), F(2, 16)  98.58, p  .001, p2  0.92, and an interaction
between these two factors, F(2, 16)  20.40, p  .001, p2  0.72.
Independent-samples t tests showed that Group Decision were
more likely than Group Standard to mention both goals (Group
Decision: M  24.40, SEM  1.81: Group Standard: M  9.60,
SEM  1.96), t(8)  5.55, p  .01, d  3.92, and expected
outcomes (Group Decision: M  5.60, SEM  1.60; Group Stan-
dard: M  1.60, SEM  0.24), t(8)  2.47, p  .05, d  1.75.
There was no statistical difference between the frequency with
which the groups mentioned benefits/risks (Decision: M  2.20,
SEM  0.58; Standard: M  1.80, SEM  0.58), t(8)  0.37, p 
.72, d  0.26. Finally, the latency to respond to the unexpected
injects did not differ between Groups Standard (M  2.59s,
SEM 0.58) and Decision (M 1.76s, SEM 0.22), t(8) 1.35,
p  .21, d  0.95.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we assessed the impact of goal-oriented train-
ing on the decision-making activity of Levels 1 and 2 commanders
who were attending a “live burn” that recreated the house fire
scenario from Experiments 1 and 2. The live burn involved setting
fire to a building that had previously served as accommodation.
The characters, injects and timings matched, as closely as possible,
those from the equivalent scenario in Experiments 1 and 2.
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Fire-ground recreations of VR incidents (a house fire, road traffic collision, and skip
fire). Mean (SEM) conditional probabilities of transition from situation assessment (to PF or PE; upper panel);
from plan formulation (to PE or SA; center panel); and from plan execution (to SA or PF; lower panel). The
scores for Groups Standard and Decision are pooled across the three types of incident scenarios. All participants
were Level 1 incident commanders. VR  virtual reality; SA  situation assessment; PE  plan execution;
PF  plan formation.
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402 COHEN-HATTON AND HONEY
Method
Participants. Twenty-four male incident commanders volun-
teered for this study and provided informed consent for their
participation in accordance with local ethical approval through the
School of Psychology, Cardiff University. They were drawn from
two United Kingdom Fire and Rescue Services: Hampshire Fire
and Rescue Service, and Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service. As
in Experiment 1, the sample included Level 1 incident command-
ers (N  12) and Level 2 commanders (N  12) who were placed
in four groups (i.e., Standard/Level 1, Decision/Level 1, Standard/
Level 2, Decision/Level 2), with the commanders from the two
Fire and Rescue Services evenly distributed across the four groups.
The mean overall command experience was 9.61 years (SEM 
0.89; range: 1.00–15.30 years; 4 officers 5 years, 16 with 5–10
years inclusive, 4 with 11–15 years inclusive, 0 with16–20 inclu-
sive, 0 with 20 years). The mean command experience in the
current position was 6.84 years (SEM  0.88; range: 1.00–17.00
years; 10 officers with 5 years, 10 with 5–10 years inclusive, 3
with 11–15 years inclusive, 1 with 16–20 inclusive, 0 officers20
years).
Equipment. Participants arrived at the incidents in either a
standard fire engine similar to that described in Experiment 2
(Level 1 Commanders) or their own fire response cars (Level 2
Commanders), and wore standard issue fire service uniforms again
supplemented with a helmet-mounted 1,080 p high-definition
video cameras (GoPro Hero 3, Half Moon Bay). The footage was
replayed to participants on a laptop computer (HP Pavilion,
Hewlett Packard), on a 15.2” screen during a cued-recall debrief
interview.
Scenario and procedure. The house fire scenario matched
that used in Experiments 1 and 2, with the same characters, injects,
and timings. The principal difference between Experiment 3 and
Experiment 2 was that the scenario now involved fire. As in
Experiments 1 and 2, each participant was briefed on the proce-
dure, gave informed consent for their participation, and were
randomly assigned to either Group Standard or Group Decision
and received their designated training in the same way as Exper-
iment 1. They were then mobilized from a fire engine that was
about .5 miles from the incident, where they received instructions
on the nature and location of the call, which mirrored normal
practice. The characters and crews were not informed about the
training give to the incident commanders. As in Experiments 1 and
2, immediately after each scenario, participants took part in a
cued-recall debrief. Other details of the procedure that have not been
mentioned were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Lag sequential analysis. Figure 3 depicts the mean condi-
tional probabilities for the three types of transition: from SA to
either PF or PE (upper panels), from PF to either PE or SA (middle
panels), and from PE to either SA or PF (lower panels). The results
were pooled across whether the participants were Levels 1 or 2
incident commanders, because statistical analyses revealed that
this factor had no independent effect and did not interact with
group (Fs 1). As in Experiments 1 and 2, the SA-PE transitional
probabilities differed between Groups Standard and Decision,
t(22) 4.38, p .001, d 1.87; and one-sample t tests confirmed
that the SA-PE transition was more likely than would be expected
on the basis of chance (0.50) in Group Standard, t(11) 4.29, p
.005, d  1.24, whereas this bias was markedly reduced if not
significantly reversed in Group Decision, t(11)  1.56, p  .14,
d  0.45. In both groups, the PF-PE transition was more likely
than the PF-SA transition, and there was some indication that this
pattern was especially marked in Group Decision.2 An
independent-samples t test confirmed that the groups differed,
t(22)  2.23, p  .05, d  0.95, and one-sample t tests showed
that the PF-PE transition was more likely than would be expected
on the basis of chance (0.50) in both Group Standard, t(11) 2.71,
p .05, d 0.78, and in Group Decision, t(11) 12.67, p .001,
d  3.66. Finally, analysis of the PE-SA transition confirmed that
the groups did not differ, t(22)  1.59, p  .12, d  0.68; and
one-sample t tests confirmed that the PE-SA transition was more
likely than would be expected on the basis of chance (.50) in
Groups Standard, t(11) 23.46, p .001, d 6.77, and Decision,
t(11)  60.56, p  .001, d  17.48.
Situation awareness. Over the course of the incidents, there
was more Level 3 situation awareness (anticipation) at the SA
transitions in Group Decision (M  4.92, SEM  0.94) than in
Group Standard (M  0.92, SEM  0.34), t(22)  4.00, p  .01,
d  1.72. The overall frequency of transitions from SA did not
differ between the groups (Standard: M  18.00, SEM  1.54;
Decision: M  18.67, SEM  1.10), t(22)  0.35, p  .72, d 
0.15.
Manipulation checks. Participants in Group Decision were
more likely to mention decision controls than those in Group
Standard. ANOVA revealed an effect of group, F(1, 22)  41.39,
p .001, p2  0.65, decision control, F(2, 44) 71.39, p .001,
p2  0.76, and an interaction between these factors F(2, 44) 
4.39, p .05, p2 0.17. Independent-samples t tests revealed that
Group Decision were more likely than Group Standard to mention
goals (Decision: M  8.75, SEM  0.74; Standard: M  4.58,
SEM  0.56), t(22)  4.62, p  .001, d  1.97, expected
consequences (Decision: M  4.17, SEM  0.34; Standard: M 
1.42, SEM  0.40), t(22)  5.22, p  .001, d  2.23, and
benefits/risks (Decision: M  2.25, SEM  0.49; Standard: M 
0.75, SEM  0.22), t(22)  2.78, p  .05, d  1.18. Finally, the
latency to respond to unexpected injects did not differ between
Group Standard (M  1.50 s, SEM  0.23) and Group Decision
(M  2.67 s, SEM  .0.65), t(22)  1.70, p  .10, d  0.72.
General Discussion
Converging evidence suggests that incident commanders from
the fire and rescue services, who are prosecuting their roles at
emergency incidents, frequently initiate actions without making
explicit plans (e.g., Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015; Klein et al., 1989;
Rake & Njå, 2009). This practice might reflect either a reliance on
reflexive processes or a failure to make explicit, plans formulated
and evaluated through reflective processes. It has been argued that
promoting the development of explicit plans enables shared situ-
ational awareness and goals to support a common operating picture
(e.g., Endsley, 1995; Schmitt & Klein, 1999), and facilitates in-
teroperability (Alison et al., 2015; House et al., 2014; Stanton et
2 The conditional probabilities for PF-PE and PF-SA do not sum to one
in Group Standard because for one participant there were no instances of
plan formulation (i.e., both conditional probabilities were zero).
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403GOAL-ORIENTED TRAINING
al., 2015). Here, we assessed whether explicit plan formulation
could be promoted through training that encouraged experienced
incident commanders, within the United Kingdom Fire and Rescue
Service, to consider three questions before initiating actions: Why
am I doing this (i.e., what are my goals)? What do I expect to
happen (i.e., what are the anticipated consequences)? Are the
benefits worth the risks? That is, we assessed the effect of goal-
oriented training on decision-making processes. The three exper-
iments used a range of scenarios (a house fire, road traffic colli-
sion, and skip fire) that were either presented within a fully
immersive VR environment (Experiment 1), recreated on the fire-
ground (Experiment 2) or as a “live burn” to which the fire crews
and incident commanders responded as an emergency incident
(Experiment 3). The activity of incident commanders was recorded
and then categorized as reflecting SA, PF, and PE (see Table 1;
Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015; see also, McLennan et al., 1997). The
results of the experiments provided consistent support for a num-
ber of conclusions concerning the way in which goal-oriented
training affected the command of the simulated incidents and the
utility of the simulated exercises more broadly.
The principal observation that motivated the current research
was that SA is more likely to be followed by PE than PF in
incident commanders attending live incidents (e.g., Cohen-Hatton
et al., 2015) and in those recalling their experiences in the field
(Klein et al., 1989; see also, Rake & Njå, 2009). In Experiments
1–3, experienced incident commanders given standard training
exhibited this pattern of transitions in all three simulated environ-
ments (involving VR, fire ground, and live burns). This observa-
tion confirmed that our simulated environments generate patterns
of activity that mirror those observed at a range of live incidents
(Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015), and provide an effective baseline
against which to assess the efficacy of goal-oriented training: The
primary objective of the three experiments. In each experiment,
goal-oriented training, involving encouraging the use of decision
controls (considering goals, consequences, and an analysis of risk),
affected whether the transition from situation awareness was to
Figure 3. Experiment 3: Live house fire. Mean (SEM) conditional probabilities of transition from situation
assessment (to PF or PE; upper panel); from plan formulation (PE or SA; middle panel); and from plan execution
(to SA or PF; lower panel). The scores for Groups Standard and Decision and are pooled across the level of the
incident commander (Level 1 or 2). SA  situation assessment; PE  plan execution; PF  plan formation.
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404 COHEN-HATTON AND HONEY
plan formulation or plan execution: Incident commanders given
goal-oriented training were more likely to show plan formulation
(and less likely to show plan execution) after situation assessment
than those given standard training. This change in the transitions
from SA was accompanied by an increase in the overall tendency
for participants to give explicit consideration to goals and antici-
pated consequences, and increased anticipatory situation aware-
ness. Moreover these changes occurred without increases in the
latency to respond to unexpected injects within the three simulated
environments. The latter finding suggests that training in the use of
decision controls did not result in a general reduction in the
capacity of participants to respond quickly to unfolding events.
The influence of goal-oriented training on conditional transition
probabilities from SA, PF and PE was restricted to the transitions
from SA. The transition from SA to PE was originally targeted
given the assumption that this transition was based on reflexive
processes that were not mediated by reflective planful processes
(Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015; see also, Klein et al., 1989; Rake &
Njå, 2009). It was assumed that those transitions from PF to PE (or
SA) were under the control of reflective processes and would be
relatively unaffected by training designed to encourage these same
processes. Consistent with this prediction, goal-oriented training
had no significant impact on the transitions from PF (to either PE
or SA). The different effects of goal-oriented training on transi-
tions from SA to PE and from PF to PE represent a striking
confirmation of our interpretation of previous results, involving
live incidents, and of the view that goal-oriented training affected
incident commander activity in the present experiments through
changing the balance between reflective and reflexive processes.
How goal-oriented training affects this balance cannot be deter-
mined on the basis of the results of Experiments 1–3, and will be
a subject for future research. One possibility is that it increases the
accessibility of goal-directed systems that subserve planful behav-
ior, but would otherwise be overridden by more habitual, stimulus-
driven processes (e.g., recognition priming; Klein, 1993; see also,
Ajzen, 1991; Gore et al., 2015) or associative priming (e.g., Doya,
2008; Honey, 2000). The impact of changes in the balance be-
tween reflective and reflexive processes on failures to arrive at a
decision (e.g., decision inertia; Alison et al., 2015) is another
potential avenue for future research.
The finding that a relatively brief period of goal-oriented train-
ing had a marked impact on the nature of decision making is
surprising given the nature of the participants, most of whom had
many years of experience in their current role. The results of
Experiments 1–3 show that training in the use of decision controls
is an effective means of generating explicit planning in incident
commanders that should provide the basis for more effective
communication with their crews (cf. Endsley, 1995; Schmitt &
Klein, 1999). It should be acknowledged that we have no direct
evidence that communication was improved, and nor do we know
whether or not the observed changes in decision-making processes
were linked to changes in the nature or effectiveness of the
decisions that were generated. Further research will be needed to
assess these issues. However, it certainly seems plausible to sup-
pose that the changes in decision-making processes in Experiments
1–3 would provide the basis for more effective communication.
Before concluding this discussion it is worth reflecting on the
utility of simulated exercises more generally. The downward trend
in the number of operational incidents (e.g., Department for Com-
munities and Local Government, 2014) means that incident com-
manders receive less operational field experience than was the case
in the past. Simulated exercises—whether using computer-
generated scenarios or traditional training ground exercises—are a
widely used substitute. However, there are many differences be-
tween simulations and reality, such as the level of actual risk,
uncertainty, and moral pressures. The degree to which they reflect
real-life decisions is currently unexplored in relation to command.
In Experiments 1–3, the same scenarios were used across a range
of simulated environments, with differing degrees of realism (VR,
fireground, and live burns). The patterns of decision making were
remarkably similar across the three environments, and participants
who received standard training behaved in a manner that was very
similar to that observed at live incidents in a recent field study
(Cohen-Hatton et al., 2015; see also, Klein et al., 1989; Rake &
Njå, 2009). Moreover, the impact of goal-oriented training was
also consistent across the three environments. Taken together, this
evidence suggests that an increase in the use of command-focused
simulations, with a focus on risk-critical and difficult decisions,
will prove to be a useful part of a wider strategy to replace the
experience lost through the decline in operational incidents.
To summarize: The results of three experiments show that
goal-oriented training affects decision-making processes in expe-
rienced incident commanders across a variety of simulated envi-
ronments ranging from immersive VR through to live burns. These
findings indicate that the goals and the anticipated consequences of
different courses of action are appropriate targets for training
interventions, which can change the balance between reflective
and reflexive processes. Such changes in decision-making pro-
cesses offer the potential to increase the effectiveness of commu-
nication between members of emergency fire crews and to im-
prove safety.
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